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1. Introduction
In the past, politicians talked a lot about privatizations, but little was done to achieve them. The
Italian public sector still accounts for over 25% of the whole economy and plays a decisive role in some
fundamental areas of the system.
In the 70’s and 80’s there were many privatizations by means of the sell-off of shares owned, in
particular, by IRI, ENI and GEPI; in most cases however, the assignments regarded small and medium
sized firms, often motivated by policies and strategies of every holding group. The situation has changed in
the last few years. The pressure of the heavy state deficit, the convergence of ideologies present in many
Western European countries towards a more wide-reaching private initiative, the dissatisfaction with the
way of managing and the desire to find a solution to the growing mixture of politics and firm activities have
given rise to a process that seems to be defining a “break” with the past.
This new direction is taking different paths: the transformation of government departments into public
limited companies (for example State Monopolies), the transformation of public corporations (Enti) into
public limited companies (public banks and savings banks) and the granting of public branches to public
corporations (The Post Office). However, as S. Cassese ( 1996) points out, “the most important phases”,
are only at the beginning. They concern the alienation of the shares of the public corporations transformed
into joint-stock companies and the definition of a public control over the strategic activities carried out by
the privatized companies. Despite the delay, it must be pointed out that the transformation of public
corporations into public limited companies is a fundamental basis to privatize and to limit political
interference in the strategies of the firms. Furthermore, some important assignments are currently taking
place (ENI), others have been concluded (STET), and an authority has been set up for the energy, radio-
television and telecommunications sectors.
The new ways of working and the effect on the final consumer, especially with reference to
privatizations, must however be evaluated carefully. International experience and the indications that
emerge in particular from England can be very useful.
With regards to this subject, there is agreement on the positive contribution made by regulation on
the efficiency of firms in the public sector (G. Yarrow, 1986; M. Bishop, D. Thompson, 1992) whereas
there are contrasting opinions on the effects of the change of ownership. The analysis carried out by K.
Hartley, D. Parker and S. Martin (1991) on 10 large English firms, including certain units that were going to
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be assigned to the private sector shows an improvement in performance as control approaches the purer
forms of privatization. On the other hand, the theoretical and empirical arguments put forward by Yarrow
(1986) confirm the importance of regulation or competition, but questions the positive effects of a change in
ownership. In particular, the analysis of productivity leads to a favourable conclusion on private property in
competitive markets and a strong regulation for natural monopoly. Studies made especially in the electric
and water sectors (Willner, 1996) indicate that the efficiency of the public and private operators is basically
homogeneous or slightly in favour of the public sector. In a more recent work (Parker, Martin and
Boussofiane, 1996), the efficiency of the 10 largest privatised firms in Great Britain were analysed, using
the data envelopment analysis (DEA), obtaining contrasting results lacking clear evidence in favour of
performances following the change of property.
It is difficult to carry out an analysis to evaluate the effects of privatization in Italy as the most
important operations have just begun. Anyway, it is possible to investigate the small and medium size firms
that have been transferred to the private sector and have maintained legal autonomy. They are firms
operating in so-called “competitive” markets and the economic results obtained as private operators can
contribute, though not extensively, to an opinion on the policies that are being implemented.
The following work is based on the analyses of the performance of some firms that have been
privatized in the last fifteen years and is set out in the following way: Section 2 looks at the different
theoretical proposals regarding privatizations and highlights the importance of competition; Section 3
describes the data base and methodological aspects; Section 4 presents the results, and Section 5 puts
forward an interpretation of the situation in Italy; the conclusions end the work.
2. Theorical background
2.1 Public or private ownership?
The privatization process that has been started up in the last fifteen years in Europe goes directly
against the trend in the previous thirty years, when many public acquisitions were made. Many justifications
were made in favour of nationalisation; in general, they were linked to the poor functioning of the market in
the allocation of resources and the subsequent presence of a monopoly power in certain sectors. On the
other hand the desire to follow redistributive aims pushed the governments to directly provide essential
services for the economic and social systems (Chiri, 1989).
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However, after years of public ownership a great amount of literature characterised by critical
findings towards the role of the public sector appeared. At the same time, many studies re-dimensioned the
importance of “control” as being the only explanatory variable of the quality and efficiency performance of
the firms.
Buchanan (1988) pointed out that public choices, being motivated by specific distributive effects in
favour of certain subjects, do not permit the facing of losses of efficiency linked to the externality towards
other subjects. Considering that state intervention is expensive, as an alternative some have suggested the
possibility of solving the problem of externality using market agreements (Coase, 1960) or contracts with
private management (Demsetz, 1968). Others have proposed the use of regulation (Posner, 1971) or the
introduction of competitive mechanisms (franchise biddings) when granting the management of public
goods to privates (Sappington and Stiglitz, 1987).
A reduced efficiency of the public firms from empirical analyses suggests a greater complexity of the
“agency contract” to the public operator and the opinion of those experts who maintain the importance of
property rights approach1.
This theory arises from the informative asymmetries concerning the agency relationship (Arrow,
1985) that links the principal (in this case, public administration) to the agent (management of the public
firm). The managers of the public firms, like those of the private ones, enjoy informative advantages and the
public property would appear less efficient in order to control such a strong position. In effect, the non-
transferability of public firm ownership results in less efficiency of the agents of the public firms and to
“quieter lives”  (Borcherding et alii, 1982), (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). Furthermore, public ownership
provides fewer stimuli to the innovative process, grants longer lasting contracts to directors, acts to the
advantage of the voters of the winning political parties, to the advantage of the firms rather than the citizens
and to an over capitalisation (De Alessi, 1974). This would not happen in the case of private ownership.
The mechanisms that regulate the financial market and in particular the risk of take-over, with the
subsequent change of the  management and the possibility of failure of the firms, pushes the managers
towards a more efficient behaviour2.
The non-transferability of the property and the above-mentioned observations would not seem to be
sufficient to explain the weaker strength of the delegated management on behalf of the public operator. In
                                                
1 Compare the wide survey of T.E. Borcherding et alii, pg. 129-136.
2 The threat of take-over also has negative effects. Tirole claims that the danger of hostile acquisitions leads the manager
towards a shortsighted view, based on the redution of long-term investments, creates instability in the managers’ careers
6fact, it should be possible to define contractual forms in such a way as to subject the public manager to the
same efficiency ties that  the private operator has. According to Grosmann and Hart (1986), the
importance of the form of control should be precisely attributed to the fact that it is impossible to define
complete contracts (incomplete contracts). On the basis of the possessory title each individual will have
an ex post task, of managing everything that has not been previously defined by the agency agreement. In
particular, K.M. Schmidt (1996), by means of a theoretical model, shows that the Government is better
informed if it owns the firm, and this situation leads it to prefer choices that reward production volumes
(allocational efficiency). This takes place even if it is necessary to subsidise the structures that are
particularly costly at a later date. The manager would not have much incentive in this context to save on
costs (soft budget constraint). With privatization, the  information given to the Government would be
greatly reduced and therefore the chance and/or the political duty regarding any further  support would
cease. Consequently the manager turns out to be more responsible for efficiency management (a harder
budget constraint) because Government support cannot be counted on. However, this process penalises
allocational efficiency in favour of productive efficiency.
2.2 Privatization or competition?
Public-private dichotomy has often been associated with the competitive conditions of the markets
that mainly characterise the workings of the two forms of control.
The analysis of the management of main public departments where there is no competition (public
works, council services, education and healthcare) has emphasised the role of bureaucracy in the running of
the public institutions (public choice approach)3. This theory is quite close to the one previously examined,
but is different in the emphasis placed on the lack of competition regarding the public area compared to the
private one. For example, Niskamen (1971) maintains that the bureaucrat, like everybody, is interested in
higher pay, power and prestige. The absence of competition pushes these subjects to risk less (De Alessi,
1974), to spend a lot and to indulge the interests of the political forces. This creates a higher capital-work
ratio, an excess of staff, higher wages and finally the “failure of the State” as an entrepreneur4.
                                                                                                                                                                 
with potentially adverse behaviours regarding the firm’s interests and makes relations between the manager and workers
closer, forming a coalition against the property. (Tirole, 1988, pag. 43-44).
3 On the subject: T.E. Borcherding et alii, in the work cited pg. 137-143.
4 This expression is used by S. Chiri recalling Buchanan’s analysis (1988) regarding “Political Failure”, in the work cited,
pg. 90.
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More in general, in the empirical researches the trade-off between competitions and privatization
seems in favour of the competition.
Several studies indicate that truly competitive markets are not clearly favourable towards private
firms rather than public ones (Willner, 1996), (Chiri, 1989), (Vickers Yarrow, 1988), (Millward, 1982).
Savas (1977) showed that the introduction of competition in refuse collection led to a considerable
homogeneity in costs of the private and public firms. In the air transport search, Ashworth and Forsyth
(1984) discovered that Air Canada proved to be the most efficient; it was the only public firm operating in
a competitive market (North America).
The analysis of the privatization processes carried out at international level show that the true
improvements in the performance are linked to the presence of competitive markets (Yarrow, 1986) or to
the introduction of some degrees of liberalisation of the market mechanisms (Kay and Thompson, 1986).
Furthermore, a study of the time series regarding the nationalised firms themselves shows that significant
improvements in productivity have only been made where real competition has been introduced (Molyneux
and Thompson, 1987).
2.3 The role of competition
It is widely thought that competition is preferable to monopolies because it reduces monopolistic
incomes, puts pressure on costs and stimulates efficiency. As far as the studies aimed at motivating the
phenomenon are concerned, Nickell (1966) notes that the  analyses regarding the impact on profitability
are more numerous compared to the subject of productivity. Theoretical interpretations have different links
on this subject.
An initial viewpoint is based on the effectiveness of the incentive systems. The presence of incomes
linked to monopolies would make life easier and less problematical both for the management and the
workers, thus creating less efficiency. It is anyhow obvious that the property is not motionless and
predisposes suitable tools for control as well as incentives aimed at stimulating the firm’s structure.
Competition however turns out to be more effective as it  gives rise to a horizontal comparison of the
performance of the firms belonging to the same business area. The theoretical works of Hart  (1983),
Nolebuff and Stigliz (1983) and Mookhrjee (1984) show that the various motivating systems are more
effective as the number of operators on the market increases.
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A similar view arises from the possibility of an indirect comparison of the managers’ performance.
According to  Meyer and Vickers (1995), the management’s commitment towards efficiency does not
mean immediate higher incomes, but increases the prestige of the firm as well as its future professional
image. Competition stimulates the activity of the manager since the presence of several firms highlights
passive behaviours and as a result penalises the image of the director.
A different interpretative picture gives importance to competition in that entrepreneurial activities
would have a fundamental role in this context in defining the level of profitability. As competition increases,
so does the number of initiatives made by the property to stimulate the manager towards efficiency.
Furthermore, the efforts made by the management are emphasised because competition increases the
chance of failure.
Other works indicate that as well as stimulating the manager, competition also stimulates the
workers. The presence of monopolistic incomes allows trade unions to strive for higher salaries.
Competition reduces profit margins and increases the  trade-off  between salaries and productivity.
As far as the empirical tests regarding the effectiveness of competition on productivity are concerned,
Nickell’s survey (1996) cites some examples that are not the result of rigorous “scientific” analyses but can
be appreciated by all. This is the case of the low productivity in Eastern Europe compared to that in the
West, the role of internal competition on the Japanese market as the key to the world success of many
Japanese firms and the liberalisation of numerous productive compartments which are followed by
significant improvements in productivity. The analyses containing a higher “scientific” content, link the
contribution of competition to many  variables that are essential for the productive system. It has been
proven that  concentration and other forms of monopolistic power reduce the level of innovation and
technical progress. The estimate of functions relative to the productive margins has made it possible to
verify that an increase in concentration reduces technical efficiency. The analysis of productivity by means
of “panel data” leads to similar conclusions: the increase in market share and concentration determine a
reduction in the level of  total productivity. The connection with the growth production rates however yields
contradictory results. The most recent estimate comes from Nickell (1996) and confirms that  the increase
in the number of competitors and the low income levels are linked to higher productivity development rates.
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2.4 The peculiarity of Italy
Previous analyses suggest that there is another important element in the subject of privatization: the
improvement of the competitive set-up by means of deregulation and the liberalisation of the market5.
Privatization can lead to unsatisfactory results if, together with the change in ownership, interventions in the
agency relationships and market control are not made6. For this reason some authors state that the
phenomenon of privatization basically consists in making the market work (Clarkson, 1989). This opinion,
though not strictly part of the subject of privatization, is important for the interpretation of the situation in
Italy.
Many empirical works emphasise that Italy lacks a sufficient competition. A comparison of the
behaviour of profit levels in the long run (Fraquelli, 1994) shows that Italy has the strongest correlation in
the trend profits of each firm. This means a greater “persistence” in profits and at the same time a
weakness in the competitive conditions. This situation, helped by direct or indirect aid provided by public
administration, enables the survival of fragile firms characterized by very low competitivity and insufficient
added value per employee. M. Monti (1993), on the subject of the features of the Italian employment
crisis, emphasises that productive efficiency and solidarity can exist at the same time. This goal is possible
with an efficient price structure and a tax system that deals with the subject of redistribution in a suitable
way. Moreover he claims that “Markets in general must be more regulated and at the same time freer: there
should be greater public intervention to safeguard competition and less public intervention in the fixing of
prices and quantities”. Always on the subject of “features of the current crisis”, C. Antonelli and G.
Militello (1994) point out the inadequacy of the traditional industrial policy tools such as: financial benefits,
support to the firms regarding demand and the tendency of public administration to aid or protect only
certain industries. They suggest an improvement of the information available for the various operators and a
creation of a new industrial policy. Privatization mast be linked to rules aimed at guaranteeing transparency
and competition among the economic operators.
Even though some (Lunghini, 1996) feel that the recovery of competition and a better regulation are
no longer sufficient to guarantee development, employment and efficiency, the idea put forward by F.
Gobbo (1996) is equally convincing. He claims that the lack of competition in the goods markets and the
insufficient regulation in the service sector have created implicit aids to capital and work and have therefore
                                                
5 W.Wright (1996) defines the proposal of privatization as a synonym of efficiency-competition as being a “paradox”,
because with nationalisation there are often significant improvements in efficiency and especially as governments
committed to privatization have often imposed limits on competition.
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hindered economic growth as well as contributing to unemployment. Furthermore, the weakness of the
Italian industrial structure also seems to be linked to the inadequacy of the competitive mechanisms in many
industrial markets.
3. Data set and methodological aspects
3.1 Data
The analysis refers to the Nomisma Data Bank regarding private acquisitions from the public sector
between 1978-1993 (Nomisma, 1996). The group of industrial firms identified in this way underwent
further selections making a comparison with the Ceris-Panel (Margon, Sembenelli, Vannoni, 1995) that
was built up upon firm data from Mediobanca and sector data from Istat. In order to analyse the effects of
privatization, we considered a sufficiently long time series so as to enable a correct evaluation of the “pre”
and “post” situation. Therefore 38 firms were identified, where at least six annual observations, including
the three years prior to the privatizations (as well as the year shares were transferred) and the three years
following privatization were available. The final selection, aimed at the availability of homogeneous time
series, that had not been invalidated by mergers, demergers, or other upheavals linked to balance-sheet
policies, led to a group of 20 firms (Tab. 1).
A sample useful for the comparison and normalisation of data was also identified. It is based as
before on the Ceris-Panel and regards the public firms that were not privatized, firms that had always been
private and firms belonging to the same industrial sector of each privatized unit. For each firm specifics
“control sample” were defined based on the time series characterised by coinciding years. It should be
specified that they are an “open” sample in that the averages for each year take into consideration a
different number of units. In any case, the comparison is certainly significant in that the control sample has
on average involved more that 40 public firms, 300 private firms and 30 firms in the group it belongs to.
                                                                                                                                                                 
6 S. Chiri, work cited pg 88.
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3.2 Methodological aspects
An analysis of the performance for the periods prior to and following privatization required a great
job of normalisation of data. As it was dealing with the time series of different periods, a process of
homogenization of the indicators relative to the various firms was necessary7.
The variables of each firm were normalised by subtracting, for each specific year considered, the
average of the respective variables in the control sample. If (Xti) is the time value t of the X variable
belonging to firm i and  (`Xtc) is the average time value t of variable X for control sample c, the normalised
data (XtNi) is equal to: XtNi = (Xti-`Xtc). Furthermore, for a comparison between variables expressed as
absolute values (e.g. added value per employee) and other indicators where the absolute differences are
not very significant, the percentage ratio between the data of the privatized firm and the control variable is
indicated thus: XtNi = (Xti /`Xtc) · 100.
Such operations have enabled the avoidance of distortions of the cycle and in part of the inflationistic
phenomenon too. However, the correction is only partial in that the inflation regarding each firm is not
exactly homogeneous with that of the control samples.
The normalised annual data was then grouped into two periods that precede and follow the
ownership changing process and the simple period average for each variable was elaborated. The year of
privatization is indicated by (t). The comparison between the normalised values of the years prior to
privatization (t2, t1, t) and those following privatization (t+1, t+2, t+3) were felt to be useful. On this subject, it
should be remembered that  the year (t) when corporate transferral takes place is often omitted in literature,
because it can be subject to upheavals deriving from the transformations being made. In this case, however,
this information was considered useful too, bearing the difficulty of having time series sufficiently long and
considering that the analysis of  the performance of the variable to time (t) does not generally present
particular differences compared to years t-1 and t-2.
The normalised values regarding the periods “pre” and “post” privatization therefore underwent
statistical tests aimed at verifying the existence of significant differences, using the non parametrical Mann-
Whitney test8.
                                                
7 The methodological aspect followed a path that was in part similar to the one used by F. Guelpa (1992) for the analysis
of the effects of acquisitions in Italy. F. Guelpa, work cited.
8 The  Mann-Whitney test is of the non-parametrical type. Apart from the probability distribution of the random variable
being tested, it enables the verification of the source of two independent samples from the same population  turning to
the transformation in  ranks of the observations.
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4. The results
4.1 Profitability and industrial margins
In evaluating the performance of privatized firms it is necessary to begin the analysis from the data
regarding global profitability, operating a consequent disaggregation geared towards the identification of the
variables that enable an interpretation of the global data.
The comparison between the operating income and operating capital (Tab. 2) shows that the
movement from public control to a private one has brought about an improvement of about 4-5 percentage
points (statistically significant).
Such a result will be the subject of study following a path that involves an analysis of the operating
activity of growth, productivity and financial transformations.
The set of indicators listed in table 2 highlights the different contributions of the economic variables
that characterize the operating management.
The ratio between  the added value and sales, compared to the “control samples”, shows a slight
decrease in time. It falls from 93% to 90% with regards to public firms, is almost stable compared to the
value of privatized firms and drops from 110% to 105% with regards to the single privatized units of the
sector they belong to. Such a development can be linked to a reduction in margins on costs or to changes
in the degree of vertical integration and  cost structure. The presence of annual variations that are very
limited makes it difficult to interpret the data, but, anyway, an articulated analysis of the set of variables that
interact on the added value makes the second hypothesis more convincing.
With reference to the size of the added value and its composition, it is useful to explore the price
conditions and efficiency in the use of productive factors. It can be seen that privatization has a positive
effect on the short-term management of firms. This sign arises from the analysis of the return on sales
(Operating income / Sales). The differences compared to the three control samples are practically
eliminated and this progress (even though it is not statistically significant) is certainly influenced by the drop
in the labour cost / turnover ratio. The latter shows a drop of about 8 percentage points compared to
public firms, about 10 points compared to private firms, and about 13 points compared to the average
sector values. Moreover, the parallel analysis of the average labour cost per employee shows that the latter
is practically stable and structurally lower by about 18 percentage points compared to the control samples.
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It is likely that this transformation has been carried out by means of a process of productive
decentralization that has created a reduction of added value compared to income, but at the same time it
has enabled the increase of profit share.
The development described above basically saves labour costs and is mainly associated to the
quantity of production. It seems to provide further confirmation on the theories that attribute a greater
effectiveness in the agency relationship between managers and private ownership. This theory can be also
backed up by the higher structural impact of about 20 percentage points of labour costs on the turnover of
public firms compared to private ones.
4.2 Development and productivity
The analysis of the operating management has highlighted a considerable re-equilibrium of the
margins on turnover that can be attributed to a recovery in labour productivity. However, the result is not
sufficient to guarantee an adequate improvement in the performance of the Return on investment (Operating
income / operating Capital) compared with the private sector and with the industry sector. Such a
behaviour therefore involves an analysis of the growth process and the ways it can be carried out.
It seems clear that the change in ownership has significantly affected the strategy of the managers
causing a slow-down in the growth policies of the firms. The development rate of sales (Tab. 3), that was
previously above the average of the public firms and of the sector and equal to that of the private ones
decreases significantly, even going a few percentage points lower than the three control samples. Probably
the necessity to recover profitability pushed firm policies towards a re-organization of the existing structure.
The behaviour of the sales per employee and added value per employee (Tab. 3), with an increase of
about 9 points compared to the public firms and the sector and 7 points compared to the private area,
confirms the improvement in efficiency. The structural gap between the public area and the private one is in
any case very high. The privatized firms have absolute productivity levels that are 13 points lower than the
public firms and 25 points compared to the firms that have always been private.
A further point of interest for the analysis is the ratio between turnover and the operating capital. This
ratio shows the productivity of the operating capital. The  lack of any improvement whatsoever compared
to the initial condition is clear; the group of privatized firms have the same condition of capital productivity
as the average of the public firms. Furthermore, it should be pointed out that the public sector reveals a
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great structural weakness in the capital productivity, with a rate of sales per unit of operating capital lower
by about 23-24 percent compared to the private sector. This situation confirms the results of international
researches where it was found that the public firms are overcapitalized.
It is likely that low productivity of capital of public firms is to be linked to an excess of productive
capacity, favoured also by the ease of access to credit of the public manager. However it is difficult to
accept that in an efficient market the excess of capacity of the privatized firms cannot be absorbed. It is
true that this process takes time, but the signs that this is happening are lacking. In short, privatized firms
improve the short-term efficiency but maintain a structural gap both in labour and capital productivity.
4.3 Financial management
The analysis carried out so far has been directed towards the evaluation of operating management. In
order to obtain a complete picture of performance following the change of ownership it is therefore
necessary to consider the financial variables too. The cash-flow rate (Tab. 4) marked by the comparison
between cash-flow and sales confirms what has already been noticed: the improvement in profitability also
influences the capacity for creating internal cash and therefore eliminates the gap in the cash-flow / sales
ratio compared to the public firms. The gap regarding the private firms and the sector is reduced too.
The level of debts however confirms the different behaviour of the managers of the public sector
compared to those in the private one. The former are “agents” characterised by low risks and therefore
tend to get into greater debt compared to the private managers. The share of borrowings on the sales of the
public area exceeds that of the private area by 60% (Tab. 4). Such evidence confirms the theory and
previous empirical researches in Italy (Sarno, 1993); on the other hand, the level of debt of the privatized
firms is hard to explain: these keep their condition of greater indebtedness compared to the firms that have
always been private and regarding the sector. As was seen for the operating capital, debts also maintain a
structural gap that is difficult to justify in a competitive system without distortions in the financial market.
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5. Further studies on the changes brought about by privatization and the value of  competition
in Italy
5.1 The process of profit convergence
In order to study further the transformations brought about by privatizations, a disaggregation of the
data was made, identifying the privatized firms that had improved or worsened their profitability (Operating
Income / Operating Capital). 14 firms undergoing improvement were selected from the remaining 6 firms.
The data regarding the two new groups confirm previous analyses but it must be noted that the
performances are explained by the management of productivity and by the convergence of the profits in the
long run. In table 5, it can be seen that a positive or negative development is not simply generated by a
change in ownership; a structural convergence of income values seems to enter this process too. As time
goes by, in fact, market competition pushes the firms that differ from the average values and converge
towards the latter (D. C. Mueller, 1990; Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987; Guelpa, 1992; Fraquelli, 1994).
It can be noticed that the firms that are improving were below the average of the public firms whereas those
that are worsening had a profitability that was higher than the public ones and practically homogeneous with
the private firms and the sector they belong to.
The international comparisons give the possibility to note that the Italian process of convergence is
moving very slowly and  prevalently concerns margins on costs. However, accepting the presence of forces
that are out of the control of the company depending on the market, the managerial activity is not
secondary. The convergence process seems to have a greater impact for the group of firms with a higher
profitability. In fact, the latter show a weakening of the return on sales and the rotation of the operating
capital. The improvement of the group of 14 firms is on the other hand strongly influenced by the drop in
the impact of the labour costs compared to the turnover and the increase in the added value per employee.
Such an evolution means that policies geared towards recovering efficiency have been used.
5.2 The role of the new ownership
The new property set-ups show the  importance of corporate control. Within the units examined,
only one firm does not belong to groups and therefore the analysis also presupposes an evaluation of the
acquisition strategy by the controller.
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Literature on this subject offers contradictory judgements regarding the performance of the acquired
firms. The analysis based on the variation of the value of stocks following the announcement of the
acquisition operation (financial economics) pass a favourable judgement on the process. The works of
industrial economists, based on firm data and  on the analysis of the market structure (industrial
organization) cast doubts on  induced wealth. They tend to emphasize the prevalence of managerial
interests or simply private convenience. Guelpa’s empirical research (1992) concerning the Italian situation,
though presenting different interpretative values, concludes by giving priority to the growth strategy of the
purchasers and to the interests of management.
The results of our analysis would seem to indicate that the substitution of public "Holdings" with
private ones has affected efficiency, but has not led to a complete productive transformation. The
improvement of the added value capacity is insufficient and consequently it does not contribute to an
enrichment of the perspective value of the acquired firms. Making a complete judgement is not easy. The
subsequent three-year period following privitization may be too short to reach a significant productive re-
organization. However, it would seem fair to hypothesise that the behaviour of the controllers has been
influenced by the favourable costs and subsidies for many moves to the private sector. Nevertheless, the
weakness of the competitive forces may have contributed to slowing down the transformation processes.
5.3 The need for further investigations about the state competition
Despite improvements in efficiency, the privatized firms shows themselves to be weak, even
compared to the public firms. The group is distinguished by a lower capacity of the added value per
employee, a reduced unitary salary and a lower income per unit of invested capital. The situation remains
even after a change in ownership. The activity of  privates contributes to a streamlining of the work-force,
but does not seem to affect production quality and value. Moreover, it should be pointed out that these
firms have had the chance to benefit widely from the financial system. This situation can be found both
before and after privatization. Firms, despite a reduced capacity in the production of wealth, have obtained
extensive  financial  resources, in the form of debts.
The persistence of weaker operating conditions leads us to think that the market is hardly efficient in
the allocation of resources, particularly those of a financial nature. Furthermore, the productivity gap
between the firms that have always been public (mainly belonging to protected areas) and the private ones
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cannot be simply attributed to the nature of agency contract, but must also be linked to market policy and
the degree of competition. The individual firms examined mainly belong to areas open to external
competition, but the purchasing group, as a whole, may have benefited from the same protection found for
the public operators: we can remember the mechanisms of industrial policy in the Eighties based on financial
and sectorial incentives and subsidies.
6. Conclusions
This work has aimed at verifying the validity of the theories in favour of privatization and the
necessary assumptions in order to carry it out  correctly, by subjecting a group of industrial firms to
analysis.
The results confirm that privatization generates a stronger motivation of the manager. The comparison
with suitable control samples has shown a growth of profitability linked to a clear improvement in labour
productivity. Furthermore, the relative fall in the sales growth rate after privatization shows that private
manager have a minor tendency towards the development compared to the public one and a greater
attention to the profitability.
In many cases, the size of the recovery however still seems to be insufficient so as to guarantee an
autonomous capacity for survival within the competitive market. This situation involves  the role of the
control group and the value of competitive forces. The group seems to have managed the acquisition above
all from a short-term viewpoint; this policy has created improvements in income but has not contributed to
a long-term launch and consolidation. It is possible that such an action was favoured by the poor efficiency
of the Italian market and in particular by the insufficient selectivity of the financial market and by the
incentive system used in past years as an industrial policy tool.
The previous hypothesis requires a strong empirical verification submitted to further research, but
enables us at this point  to make some considerations that more generally concern the operations in
process.
Privatization seems to lead to improvements in efficiency but in itself does not appear to be capable
of leading firms towards a qualitative threshold that provides guarantees for the future. International
experience shows that the latter target is not simply linked to the nature of the property but presupposes a
change in the competitive game. Decisive action must be taken towards a more correct working of the
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market. This means a greater transparency and information and the elimination of distortions linked to price
factors or to particular demand incentives.
The problems that have been underlined seem to take on even greater importance in the current
period as procedures concerning public utility privatization are being perfected. In this context, it is
therefore fundamental to define a set of mechanisms and company re-organisations that favour competition.
Moreover, in the presence of natural monopoly, tough regulations must be made. In short, only preventive
“market liberalization” can lead to the correct privatization of the firm.
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Tab. 1 - The group of Privatized firms
Firm Name Period
 t-2        t+3
Sector No.Employees
     t-2        t+3
Sales (milions)
     t-2             t+3
Acciaierie di Modena 1978-1983 Metallurgic 429 246 20461 46527
Acciaierie del Tirreno 1984-1989 Metallurgic 187 214 65892 114970
Alfacavi 1979-1984 Rubber 1285 825 44728 92811
Bellco 1988-1993 Met.equip. 498 593 71983 151878
Boston 1987-1992 Chemicals 412 423 87480 79956
CMM Costruz.Mecc.Merid. 1981-1986 Mechanics 292 282 12675 24048
Ducati meccanica 1983-1988 Mechanics 540 381 30826 146007
I cotoni di Sondrio 1985-1990 Textile 945 476 97965 62005
Industria Adriatica Confez. 1988-1993 Clothing 860 633 105335 85677
Italdata 1983-1988 Electronics 384 371 25481 45234
Italtractor ITM 1988-1993 Mechanics 906 616 136273 141980
Lovere Sidermeccanica 1988-1993 Metallurgic 1725 1019 147472 146000
Recordati 1983-1988 Pharmaceut. 983 1009 86367 186386
Rivoira 1988-1993 Chemicals 561 450 102297 132293
San Giorgio Elettrodomest. 1982-1987 Electronics 803 710 80547 133149
Sanremo Moda Uomo 1986-1991 Clothing 1497 1027 89125 115261
Sclavo 1988-1993 Pharmaceut. 1445 416 195627 93729
Simmel Ind.Meccanica 1979-1984 Mechanics 1394 1272 61844 269973
Star - Stabilim. Alimentare 1983-1988 Food 2961 2332 519153 675505
Tirsotex 1986-1991 Textiles 539 463 96142 58234
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Tab. 2 - Profitability of operating capital
(Average values of privatized firms normalized with respect to the control samples)
Periods Public Private Sector
Operating margin (t-2-t) -0,0466 -0,1125 -0,1170
Operating capital (t+1-t+3) -0,0091 -0,0657 -0,0602
Operating margin (t-2-t) -0,0248 -0,0307 -0,0288
Sales (t+1-t+3) -0,0064 -0,0082 -0,0007
Added value (t-2-t) 92,6066 100,6077 109,8950
Sales (t+1-t+3) 90,2991 100,6934 104,9793
Labour cost (t-2-t) 93,1560 113,0926 120,2021
Sales (t+1-t+3) 85,0481 103,0598 107,4030
Labour cost (t-2-t) 84,7362 83,7915 83,3849
Average Employees (t+1-t+3) 82,9250 81,3620 80,9373
Mann-Whitney test: statistically significant to * 1%; ** 5%; *** 10%
(a) XtNi = (Xti - Xtc)
(b) XtNi = (Xti / Xtc)
(a)
(b)
(b)
(b)
*** **
**
(a)
Ceris-CNR, W.P. N° 2/1998
21
Tab. 3 - Productivity and development
(Average values of privatized firms normalized with respect to the control samples)
Periods Public Private Sector
Sales (t-2-t) 74,4892 54,9532 64,7745
Ave.Employees (t+1-t+3) 83,8823 62,2101 75,2456
Added Value (t-2-t) 79,5869 69,3456 70,3835
Ave Employees (t+1-t+3) 87,1753 75,8066 78,6561
Sales (t-2-t) 98,2946 76,8002 79,4195
Net.Invested Cap. (t+1-t+3) 100,9374 77,3041 81,8202
D Sales (t-2-t) 0,0544 0,0081 0,0212
(L. constants) (t+1-t+3) -0,0358 -0,0212 -0,0178
Mann-Whitney test: statistically significant to * 1%; ** 5%; *** 10%
(a) XtNi = (Xti - Xtc)
(b) XtNi = (Xti / Xtc)
Tab. 4 - Financial management
(Average values of privatized firms normalized with respect to the control samples)
Periods Public Private Sector
Cash-flow (t-2-t) -0,0076 -0,0339 -0,0265
Sales (t+1-t+3) 0,0095 -0,0112 -0,0010
Financial Debts (t-2-t) 117,3124 191,4352 173,8474
Sales (t+1-t+3) 120,1064 178,2525 168,8870
Financial Charges (t-2-t) 0,0027 0,0228 0,0180
Sales (t+1-t+3) -0,0001 0,0209 0,0160
Mann-Whitney test: statistically significant to * 1%; ** 5%; *** 10%
(a) XtNi = (Xti - Xtc)
(b) XtNi = (Xti / Xtc)
(a)
(b)
(b)
(b)
** ***
*** ***
** **
(a)
(b)
(a)
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Tab. 5 - Selection of firms that are improving (14 cases) or worsening (6 cases) the ratio:
Operating margin / Operating capital compared to the sector they belong to
(Average values of privatized firms normalized with respect to the control samples)
Public Private Sector
(i) -0,0882 -0,1554 -0,1571
Operating margin (ii) -0,0137 -0,0610 -0,0515
Operating capital (i) 0,0505 -0,0123 0,0235
(ii) 0,0017 -0,0766 -0,0806
(i) 97,4155 104,7957 106,7246
Added value (ii) 95,8094 106,4420 108,6787
Sales (i) 81,3860 90,8358 97,2925
(ii) 77,4417 87,2800 96,3476
(i) -0,0278 -0,0352 -0,0328
Operating margin (ii) 0,0021 0,0029 0,0101
Sales (i) -0,0179 -0,0201 -0,0194
(ii) -0,0263 -0,0342 -0,0258
(i) 100,0496 120,5038 126,0379
Labour cost (ii) 89,7249 106,7343 108,1533
Sales (i) 77,0710 95,7997 106,5851
(ii) 74,1355 94,4859 105,6525
(i) 84,0905 67,3397 70,6505
Sales (ii) 92,0451 70,5131 77,9484
Operating capital (i) 131,4375 98,8747 99,8805
(ii) 121,6863 93,1499 90,8544
(i) 71,4875 63,2505 67,6853
Added Value (ii) 80,6084 72,9511 79,7072
Ave. Employees (i) 98,4854 83,5675 76,6795
(ii) 102,4982 84,4695 76,2037
(i) 132,3043 207,2908 192,5256
Borrowings (ii) 138,1460 192,6751 188,1341
Sales (i) 82,3311 154,4387 130,2647
(ii) 78,0140 144,6000 123,9771
Mann-Whitney test: statistically significant to * 1%; ** 5%; *** 10%
M = group of improving firms
P = group of worsening firms
(i) = period t -2 - t
(ii) = period t+1 - t+3
(a) XtNi = (Xti - Xtc)
(b) XtNi = (Xti / Xtc)
M
(a)
P
P
M
(a)
P
M
(b)
P
M
(b)
P
M
(b)
P
M
(b)
P
M
(b)
** * *
** **
*** ***
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